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FEDERAL GRAND JURY REFORM:
A. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
Carl J. Paeinm and
Judith A. MeMorrow*
INTRODUCTION
The right to a grand jury indictment for a federal crime is firmly established
by the Fifth Amendment, which provides that, "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury . . . ." This constitutional guarantee rests in the
Bill of Rights, which is traditionally viewed as securing the protection of
personal freedoms against governmental intrusion. Yet, the grand jury has
come under attack in recent years as an instrument which serves only as a
device of oppression and a second voice of the federal prosecutor. In response
to increasing criticism of the federal grand jury, suggested reforms are currently
under scrutiny in the Congress.' This note presents a survey of the proposed
reforms as viewed against the background of the current law of the federal
grand jury and, in chart form, compares the various reactions and viewpoints
of the Department of Justice, Civil Liberties organizations, 2 the American Bar
Association, and, legal scholars. The accompanying text highlights the most
controversial areas of reform.
RIGHTS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES
1. Right to Counsel
A witness before a grand jury has no right to counsel inside the grand
jury room, on the theory that the right to confrontation does not attach at
the grand jury stage.3 A witness, however, is permitted to consult with his
attorney before responding to a question by meeting with the attorney outside
the chamber room.4
*B.A., LeMoyne College, 1975; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1979; M.B.A.
Candidate, University of Notre Dame, 1979.
**B.A., B.S., Nazareth College, 1977; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1980.
This note is an excerpt from a project report on grand jury reform by the Legislative Research Service,
Notre Dame Law School, Judith McMorrow and Carl J. Pacini, project directors.
1. H.R. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 Cong. Rec. H 316 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1977); S. 1449, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 Cong. Rec. S. 6972 (daily ed. May 4, 1977); H.R. 3736, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2620, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 4908, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
H.R. 406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. The position of various civil liberties organizations is represented by the Coalition to End Grand Jury
Abuse, an organization formed in 1973 and comprised of 21 national bar, civil liberties, labor, religious,
and women's organizations. The Coalition includes the American Civil Liberties Union, National
Lawyers' Guild, National Organization of Women, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, National
Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, Legal Aid and Defender Association, National Conference of
Black Lawyers, and National Bar Association.
3. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972); Fed.R.Cr.P. 6(d).
4. United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969); United
States v. DeSapio, 229 F.Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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Proposed reforms would entitle a witness to the presence of counsel, either
retained or appointed, in the grand jury room.5 The attorney would not be
permitted to address the grand jury, and could be removed if he attempts to
take part in the proceedings before the grand jury.
Most reformers support the House and Senate proposals 6 to permit an
attorney to be present in the jury room with the witness on the view that
counsel would protect the constitutional rights of witnesses as well as prevent
abuse and harassment on the part of the prosecution. Objections that counsel
would turn the grand jury into an adversary proceeding are countered by
analogy to the role of counsel in congressional hearings7 as well as non-adversary
proceedings.8 The argument that presence of an attorney would violate grand
jury secrecy is countered by the fact that a witness currently is not restricted
from disclosing to his attorney a complete report of the occurrences in the
grand jury room.9
2. Right to Request Appearance Before a Grand Jury
Any person may ask to testify before a grand jury concerning the subject
matter of its investigation, although the grand jury may refuse to receive this
evidence. No set procedure exists to govern the decision to receive such
testimony. 10 The individual who is the target of the investigation has no right
to notice of the investigation, or to appear before the grand jury."' A grand
jury generally will not permit a witness to testify at his own request unless
he waives the privilege against self-incrimination.
Suggested congressional reforms would permit any person to request to
testify by written notice to the attorney for the government, who in turn will
forward the request to the grand jury. The panel may refuse to receive the
evidence by majority vote.12 The target of an investigation must be notified
by the government of the right to request an appearance, unless the court
believes that dangers such as the possibility of flight, the endangering of other
witnesses, or delay, would outweigh the right to notification. The witness must
waive the right to immunity before appearing. There is no provision in the
proposed legislation which would permit a prospective defendant to request
that other relevant witnesses be called, although the witness himself may
request an appearance.
5. H.R. 94, §7(a), supra note 1; S. 1449, §6(a), supra note 1; H.R. 3736, §5(a), supra note 1; H.R.
2620, §4(a), supra note 1.
6. ABA Policy on the Grand Jury, Principle 1 (1977); Leroy Clark, The Grand Jury: The Use and
Abuse of Political Power 135 (1975); Marvin Frankel and Gary Naftalis, "The Grand Jury: An
Institution on Trial,". The New Leader, Nov. 10, 1975, at 33. The only vocal opposition appears to
come from the Department of Justice, 1977 House Hearings, infra note 31, at 723 (statement of
Department of Justice).
7. Bary Hager, "Another Chance for Revising the Grand Jury," 35 Cong. Quarterly Report 586 (1977),
quoting Rep. Joshua Eilberg.
8. An example is the Securities and Exchange Commission. Frankel and Naftalis, supra note 6, at 21.
9. Frankel and Naftalis, supra note 6, at 21.
10. United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975).
11. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. H.R. 2620, §4(a), supra note 1, calls for honoring the request unless it serves no relevant purpose.
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3. Right to Invoke the Fifth Amendment
One who testifies or presents evidence before a federal grand jury has a
right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This
right was firmly established in Counselman v. Hitchcock 13 as applying to any
"4criminal case."
Although one appearing before a grand jury may invoke the privilege, the
scope of this Fifth Amendment right has been a much-litigated issue. 14 The
confusion was dissipated in Hoffman v. United States, 15 when the Supreme
Court clearly defined the scope of the privilege:
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces
those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
the claimant for a federal crime . . . .To sustain the privilege, it need only
be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it
cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could
result. 16
Although the privilege has been given a liberal construction by the federal
courts1 7 a witness cannot make a blanket refusal to testify. 18
Despite the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, a witness does
not have a constitutional right to be given notice of the right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court has stated that it has not "decided whether any Fifth
Amendment warnings whatever are constitutionally required for grand
jury witnesses." 19 There is no clear rule regarding Fifth Amendment or
Miranda20 warnings which might be applicable to target witnesses or putative
defendents. 21
The reluctance of a witness to testify before a grand jury for fear of
self-incrimination can be surmounted by a grant of immunity. Under present
law, one who receives an immunity grant to testify has "use immunity". The
Witness Immunity Act, 22 enacted in 1970, centers on immunizing testimony
rather than witnesses, and essentially prohibits direct use of compelled testimony
13. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
14. United States v. Greenberg, 192 F.2d 201 (3rd Cir. 1952), revd 343 U.S. 918 (1952); United States
v. Trock, 232 F.2d 839 (2nd Cir. 1956), rev'd 351 U.S. 976 (1956); United States v. Singleton, 193
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd 343 U.S. 944 (1952).
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1952).
16. 341 U.S. at 486-7 (1951).
17. National Lawyers' Guild, Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries. §13.4, at 13-7
(1974)
18. Bruce Schneider, "The Grand Jury: Powers, Procedures, and Problems," 9 Columbia Journal of Law
and Social Problems 681, 714 (1973), citing Enrichi v. United States, 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954).
19. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. at 186 (1977).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. Note, "Recent Developments in the Law of the Federal Grand Jury," 1977 Utah L. Rev. 203-208
(1977).
22. Witness Immunity Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§6001-6005 (1970). 18 U.S.C. §6002 provides that: "Whenever
a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other
information 'in a proceeding before or ancillary to -
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, and the person presiding over the
proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not
refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness
in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order."
1978]
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or other information as well as indirect or derivative use.23 Prior to 1970, a
grand jury witness was legislatively required to receive "transactional immunity",
which meant that he could not be prosecuted for any offense related to
testimony given. 24
In Kastigar v. U.S., the Supreme Court laid to rest the concern that use
immunity is unconstitutional by ruling that such grants of immunity were
coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.25 However, the
Court further stressed that the prosecution subsequently bears an affirmative
duty to demonstrate "that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony."' 26
H.R. 94, the principal House of Representatives bill, introduced by Rep.
Joshua Eilberg, 27 would reintroduce transactional-nonconsensual immunity as
the exclusive type available for grand jury witnesses. An immunized witness
could only be prosecuted for perjury, for making a false statement, or for
failure to comply with the conditions of the immunity grant. Presently, the
Justice Department will approve a grant of immunity if the information is
necessary to the public interest and the witness has indicated a refusal or is
likely to refuse to testify by invoking the self-incrimination privilege.28 The
Eilberg bill would require a stricter set of standards to be satisfied before
immunity could be granted. In contrast to the present statute, which requires
a district court to issue an immunity order when the above two conditions
have been fulfilled, a district court would have discretion to grant immunity.
The proposed statute authorizes the court to issue an order when it is satisfied
that the information sought is necessary to the public interest, the witness has
invoked the Fifth Amendment, the testimony is relevant to the investigation,
the immunity grant would be adequate for the investigation, a summary of
evidence relating to the witness has been provided to the court, and there is
no danger of foreign prosecution. 29
The Justice Department has taken the strongest stand against repealing
use immunity. In testimony before Congress, Deputy Attorney General Benjamin
A. Civiletti 30 claimed the following advantages of use over transactional
immunity:
(1) it eliminates the conferring of unnecessarily broad immunity against
criminal liability;
(2) it removes the incentive for a witness to give broad but incomplete and
shallow testimony.31
23. David Sugar, "Federal Witness Immunity Problems and Practices Under 18 U.S.C. §§6002-03," 14
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 275, 279 (1977).
24. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, §802, 82 Stat. 216 (1968), 18 U.S.C. §2514
(1970), repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-452, §§227(a), 260,
84 Stat. 930. The repeal did not become complete until December 15, 1974.
25. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
26. 406 U.S. at 460.
27. H.R. 94, supra note 1. The same bill was later reintroduced with other co-sponsers as H.R. 3150.
28. 18 U.S.C. §6003(b) (1970).
29. H.R. 94, §3(a), supra note 1.
30. At the time he testified, Mr. Civiletti was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
31. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Congress, 1st Session,
713-14 (1977) (statement of Department of Justice). [Hereinafter referred to as 1977 House Hearings.]
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The Department also opposes the provision requiring the court to be satisfied
that the immunity grant meets all the enumerated conditions. It is claimed
that this would involve the judiciary in prosecutorial policy and poses a potential
separation of powers question.
32
A number of persons has responded that use immunity has not increased
the investigative power of the grand jury. The Justice Department, for example,
has not been able to identify a single case in which a member of organized
crime has given testimony under an immunity grant that led to the conviction
of a superior. Peter Richards, Deputy Attorney General of the New Jersey
Division of Criminal Justice Special Prosecution Section, has also asserted that
granting immunity to a member of organized crime simply does not work.
33
Professor Leroy Clark of New York University has also supported this position.
He has theorized that organized crime has between 3,000 and 5,000 members.
Between 1960-1969, only 235 indictments were returned against 328 alleged
members of organized crime. This occurred while transactional, not use
immunity, was in effect. This fact tends to underscore the point that use
immunity does not serve as a better tool for eliciting testimony and prosecuting
offenders. Obviously, a witness would be more willing to supply investigatory
information under a grant of transactional rather than use immunity. In fact,
the Justice Department has reported that in reality few witnesses granted use
immunity are prosecuted for crimes described in their testimony.
34
4. Recalcitrant Witnesses-Contempt
Refusal to comply with a court order, including refusal to appear before
the grand jury, testify, or produce documents may result in the issuance of a
contempt order. Such an order usually is in the form of a citation for civil
contempt, demanding compliance, rather than criminal contempt, which focuses
on punishment. 35 When it appears that a witness will be cited for contempt,
most courts permit a reasonable time for preparation for at least a cursory
contempt hearing. 36 After the contempt order is issued, the court has authority
to summarily confine the witness until testimony is forthcoming. 37 The
witness must be confined "at a suitable place" 38 until he becomes cooperative.
The period of confinement is not to exceed the life of the grand jury or 18
•months. 39 A witness, once released from jail, may be called before a subsequent
panel and again held in contempt.40
Provisions for reform call for a "show cause" hearing from a contempt
order, with 72 hours notice41 unless special need is demonstrated. The witness
would have the right to counsel. Should the witness be held in contempt, he
32. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 714 (statement of Department of Justice).
33. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 31, at 881 (statement of Coalition to End Grand Jury Abuse).
34. Sugar, supra note 23, at 282.
35. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Grand Jury Manual 243 (1976).
36. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973);
F.R.Cr.P. 6 42(b).
37. Giancana v. United States, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 959 (1965).
38. 28U.S.C. §1826(a) (1970).
39. 28 U.S.C. §1826(a) (2) (1970).
40. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966); In Re Maurey Santiago, 533 F.2d 727 (1st Cir.
1976). For a detailed review of the procedure of a .contempt hearing, see National Lawyers' Guild,
Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries (1974).
41. H.R. 94, §2(a), supra note 1; S. 1449, §2, supra note 1, would provide 5 days notice.
19781
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would be placed in a correctional institution within 50 miles of the court. 42
Imprisonment would be for the life of the grand jury, or six months, whichever
is shorter, and a witness would not be subject to repeated confinement for
the same transaction.
INDEPENDENT INQUIRY
Congress has never systematically enumerated the powers and purposes of
the grand jury. The only statutory provision which actually governs the powers
of the grand jury is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.43 The selection of
grand jurors is also regulated by statute.44 The wiretapping and immunity
statutes are used in conjunction with the grand jury but are not specifically
related to its powers. Its powers are outlined by case law and are subject to
court supervision. 45
The powers and purposes of a special grand jury are set forth in the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.46 It has no powers different from those
of a regular grand jury but serves as an additional grand jury in the district
in which it sits. 4 7 The most notable power of the special grand jury is its
ability to issue reports on the conduct of public officials. 48
Reform legislation in both the House49 and the Senate 50 would provide
that any grand jury "after giving notice to the court" may "inquire upon its
own initiative" into alleged criminal offenses. However, the Senate version
would only authorize independent inquiry into an alleged criminal offense by
any officer or agent of the U.S. government or any state or municipal
government. Under the Eilberg bill the grand jury would have a life of 18
months with the possibility of six month extensions up to a maximum of 36
months. In addition, if a grand jury is discharged by the court before it has
completed its investigation, it may appeal to the chief judge of the circuit for
an extension.
The most potent provision in both the House and Senate versions would
authorize the grand jury to request the court to replace the government attorney
with one specially appointed. This could be done upon a majority vote of the
grand jury whenever the attorney for the government is "unable to impartially
assist, refuses to assist, or hinders or impedes the grand jury in the conduct
of any inquiry . . . ,,51 Any special attorney appointed would have all the
powers and resources of a government attorney to. assist the grand jury in its
investigation. He would sign indictments, obtain materials from other government
agencies, conduct all other phases of any criminal prosecution arising out of
an independent inquiry, and be funded by Justice Department appropriations.
If enacted into law, this provision would, presumably, serve as a check on the
power of the government attorney.
42. H.R. 94, §2(a), supra note 1; S. 1449, §2, supra note 1, unless the witness suggests a suitable
alternative.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§3321-8 (1970), as amended by Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, §2(a), 91 Stat. 319.
44. 28 U.S.C. §§1861-1868 (1970).
45. United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1950); United States v. Smyth, 104 F.Supp. 283 (N.D.
Cal. 1952).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§3331-3334 (1970).
47. 18 U.S.C. §3332(a) (1970); National Lawyers' Guild, supra note 17, §7.2(c) at 7-4.
48. 18 U.S.C. §3333 (1970).
49. H.R. 94, §6(a), supra note 1.
50. S.,1449, §5(a), supra note 1.
51. H.R. 94, §6(a), supra note 1.
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GRAND JURY SECRECY, UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
AND GRAND JURY REPORTS
The federal courts have typically advanced five reasons in support of grand
jury secrecy:
1. to prevent the escape of individuals who may be indicted;
2. to guarantee the freedom of the grand jury in its deliberations and voting
and to preclude potential defendants from influencing the proceedings;
3. to prevent tampering with the witnesses who may later testify at trial;
4. to promote complete disclosure by those called to testify; and
5. to protect the accused who has been exonerated from disclosure that he
has been under investigation. 52
These reasons are valid with respect to some activities of the grand jury, but
they are less convincing when advanced as justification for secrecy concerning
all matters associated with proceedings of the "people's panel." For example,
none of the above stated reasons serves to justify the present practice of
making transcripts of grand jury testimony available to indicted defendants on
a limited basis.
53
The present law concerning the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is
contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), as amended. 54 The
first paragragh of amended Rule 6(e) imposes a restriction against disclosure
by a grand jury, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording
device, and other persons who have authorized access to grand jury proceedings,
except as permitted by the rule itself.
Exceptions to the nondisclosure rule include an attorney for the governement
and such government personnel "as are deemed necessary by an attorney for
the government" to assist that attorney in the enforcement of the criminal
law. 55 Formerly, the attorney for the government involved in the prosecution
of a case was not entrusted to pass on the necessity of assistance.56 With
such an ability provided by the amended 6(e), it seems that more frequent
and liberal disclosure of grand jury proceedings will occur. Even these exceptions
do not permit disclosure of grand jury deliberations and the vote of any grand
jurors. Finally, disclosure is also permitted when directed by the court.
The provision in Section 5 of H.R. 94 on unauthorized disclosure differs
from amended Rule 6(e), in that it prohibits disclosure by personnel assisting
government attorneys except as directed by the court. Disclosure by a witness
or by his attorney of matters to which the witness has testified is also exempted
from the secrecy requirement.
Instead of punishment by contempt order, two different penalities for
unauthorized disclosure are provided, with the particular penalty determined
by the conditions' surrounding the disclosure. Knowing disclosure of evidence
with the intent either to secure compensation, to influence the actions of the
grand jury, or to effect further legal proceedings against a witness or as to
the subject matter of any investigation, may result in the imposition of a
$20,000 fine, a five-year prison sentence, or both. This penalty would not
52. United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d at 261 (D., Md. 1931).
53. See text on Availabilty of Grand Jury Proceedings, infra.
54. See supra note 43.
55. Fed.R.Cr.P. 6(e), as amended. See supra note 43.
56. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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apply to members of the media acting in a professional capacity. The other
penal provision sanctions a $500 fine or six months in prison, or both, for
knowingly making an unauthorized disclosure.
The grand jury itself breaks the shroud of secrecy surrounding its proceedings
when it issues reports. The general argument in favor of grand jury reports
is summarized in In re Camden County Grand Jury:
57
If presentments of matters of public concern were found necessary in the
public interest in the relatively simple conditions of English and colonial life
three centuries ago, how much more essential are they in these days when
government at all levels has taken on a complexity of organization and, of
operation that defies the best intentions of the citizen to know and understand
it . . . The maintenance of popular confidence in government requires that
there be some body of laymen which may investigate any instances of public
wrongdoing. 58
The grand jury report serves the public interest if only by disclosing situations
requiring administrative, judicial, or legislative corrective action. Most such
reports are concerned with the misconduct of public officials. Indeed, a provision
of the Organized Crime Control Act59 both authorizes reports concerning
federal officials and permits the. official to offer rebuttal.
Although courts have expunged reports on occasion, clear legislative guidelines
are needed to prescribe the limits of issuing federal grand jury reports. Neither
H.R. 94 nor S. 1449 contains a provision dealing with such reports. The ABA
suggests that reports should be limited to discussing the conduct of public
officials. This would strike the necessary balance between the protection of
individuals from calumniation without chance of redress and the public interest
in being informed of governmental problems.
60
AVAILABILITY OF GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
While the recording of grand jury proceedings is desirable, 61 there is no
absolute requirement that testimony be taken and transcribed. 62 Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(d) authorizes the presence of a stenographer or
operator of a recording device in the chambers. A witness is not absolutely
entitled to a transcript of his own testimony, but may request that the
proceedings be recorded and disclosed. 63 If a witness is to appear at trial,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(a) requires the government to
provide a copy of the witness' statement made before the grand jury, if a
recordation was made. After direct examination of a witness, the defendant
is entitled to any statements by the witness which relate to the subject matter
of the examination. 64 The court, after inspection, may deny access to defendants
of statements which do not relate to the subject matter in question. 65
57. 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952).
58. 10 N.J. at 65 (1952).
59. 18 U.S.C. §3333 (1970).
60. As a model, see Fla. Stat. Ann. §905.28 (West - 1975).
61. United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970)
62. United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Labate, 270 F.2d 122. (3rd
Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 900 (1959).
63. National Lawyers' Guild, supra note 17, §8.1 at 8-1.
64. 18 U.S.C. §3500(b) (1970).
65. 18 U.S.C. §3500(c) (1970).
[Vol. 5: 121
Federal Grand Jury Reform
A copy of a transcript may be of great importance to a witness who has
been granted immunity, who may be subject to perjury due to inadvertent or
clerical errors. For those who have been immunized, a record of the testimony
would preserve tainted evidence and insure that the testimony has not produced
leads which could later be used against the witness. 66 Alleged prosecutorial
abuses, such as harassment or improper questioning, would also be preserved.
The availability of a transcript may also aid the defendant in his preparation
for trial.
H.R. 94 and S. 1449 would require the recording of all events at the
proceedings except the deliberation and voting process of the jurors, with
witnesses being entitled to examine and copy their own testimony. 67 A
witness who will appear at trial would receive a copy of any statements made
which are in the possession of the government. Under these proposals, a
defendant could, before trial, obtain copies of the testimony of all witnesses
to be called, all statements to -the grand jury, by the attorney for the government
and court, all exculpatory evidence, and other materials the court deems proper.
CONCLUSION
Supporters of grand jury reform have indicated that changes in the process
and procedure of this Fifth Amendment institution must come from the
legislative branch. Former Senator John Tunney expressed the need for legislative
action in his opening statement before the 1976 Senate hearings:
Confronted by instance after instance of grand jury abuse, the courts have
repeatedly failed to exercise their supervisory responsibilities over the grand
jury process. Because of this judicial neglect of grand jury abuse the responsibility
for reform now rests squarely on the Congress.68
However, Justice Department opposition to grand jury reform and the press
of other, more urgent problems before Congress leaves the future of this
legislation uncertain.
Rep. John Conyers, a sponser of H.R. 3736, indicates that "[t]here is a
good chance that the Subcommittee will report this year a bill partially
addressing the issue but far short of the comprehensive reforms needed." 69 A
more skeptical view is offered by Dennis J. Taylor, legislative counsel for
House Minority Leader John Rhodes:
Many in the legal profession consider the bill [H.R. 941 to be tilted too far
in favor of the defendants and initial indications are that the Justice Department
does not favor the legislation. For those reasons, it is uncertain as to when
action will be scheduled on the bill. 70
66. National Lawyers' Guild, supra note 17, §8.3(b) at 8-4.
67. H.R. 94, §8(a), supra note 1; S. 1449, §7(a), supra note 1. The Senate bill would have the transcript
available within 48 hours after the appearance.
68. Reform of the Grand Jury System. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Congress, 2nd Session 1 (1975-76).
69. Letter from John Conyers to the authors, on file with the Journal of Legislation (Jan. 26, 1978).
70. Letter from Dennis J. Taylor to the authors, on file with the Journal of Legislation (Feb. 6, 1978).
71. Letter from James Abourezk to the authors, on file with the Journal of Legislation (Feb. 20, 1978).
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Senator James Abourezk, sponser of S. 1449, also states that he has not found
much support for his proposal in the Senate. 71 Rep. Barbara Jordan suggested
that, the prospects of some grand jury reform are "very good."
'72
In light of the less than resounding support of comprehensive grand jury
reform, it appears that future sessions of Congress may again be addressing
this problem. Comprehensive reform can be expected so long as the memory
of grand jury abuse is still fresh in the minds of many supporters of such
reforms. 73 The extensive hearings both in the 94th and 95th Congress provide
a sound basis for future legislative action.
71. Letter from James. Abourezk to the authors, on file with the Journal of Legislation (Feb. 20, 1978).
72. Letter from Barbari Jordan to the authors, on file with the Journal of Leislation (Jan. 26, 1978).
73. See David J. Fine, "Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political Dissidents,' 7 Harvard Civil Rights
- Civil Liberties Law Review 432 (1972).
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